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Abstract
Model-driven engineering (MDE) promises to automate the cloud application management phases, including deployment and
adaptive provisioning. However, most MDE approaches neglect the security aspect even if it is considered the number one factor
for not migrating to the cloud. As such, this paper proposes a security meta-model that a cloud-based MDE approach can exploit
to become security-aware. This meta-model captures both high- and low-level security requirements and capabilities to drive
application deployment as well security-oriented scalability rules to guide application re-conﬁguration. It is also coupled with
OCL constraints enforcing the security domain semantics. A method for creating re-usable security elements facilitating rapid
security model speciﬁcation conforming to the meta-model is also proposed, to reduce the designer’s modelling eﬀort.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
Cloud computing promises the on-demand leashing of inﬁnite and cheap resources to provide suitable infrastructure
support to user applications. As such, it is increasingly adopted by many businesses that attempt to move their
applications in the cloud to reduce costs and automate their reconﬁguration. These businesses are assisted by free or
proprietary cloud platforms which provide support to the application deployment and reconﬁguration in the cloud.
The most sophisticated from these platforms employ model-driven engineering (MDE)1 to support the cloud ap-
plication management due to its capability to automate the cloud-based application life-cycle activities as follows:
(a) use of transformations to go from generic requirements to cloud-agnostic solutions and from those solutions to
cloud-speciﬁc ones; (b) suitable runtime support (models@runtime2) where models are carriers of live information
used to assess if user requirements are violated; (c) use of model transformations and reasoning to generate optimal
deployment plans mapped to the speciﬁcs of the cloud services involved; (d) application adaptation via migrating to a
new deployment plan which promises to better address the current application situation.
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While the aforementioned sophisticated management platforms seem to cover most user requirements and provide
the respective automated support, they do not actually cover the security aspect, while security has been considered as a
crucial factor towards cloud migration. Security could enhance the cloud application lifecycle activities as follows: (a)
security requirements can be another driving factor apart from deployment and quality requirements towards ﬁltering
the provider space and reaching optimal application deployment solutions and (b) evaluation of security parameters
(attributes or metrics) can enable assessing whether particular security levels are maintained by a cloud provider such
that adaptation actions can be executed when these levels are violated leading to application reconﬁguration.
In3, a risk assessment over cloud computing identiﬁed many risks related to security. One major risk relates to
compliance. It was argued that ”Certain organisations migrating to the cloud have made considerable investments in
achieving certiﬁcation either for competitive advantage or to meet industry standards or regulatory requirements (e.g.,
PCI DSS). This investment may be put at risk by a migration to the cloud”. To mitigate these risks during the cloud
provider selection, it is critical to assess each candidate cloud provider with respect to relevant cloud security risks.
Cloud provider assessment methodologies, such as the Cloud Security Alliance’s (CSA) Star Program Assessment
and Certiﬁcations https://cloudsecurityalliance.org/star/, aim to provide a framework to evaluate and
compare cloud providers. Such assessment methodologies rely on Cloud security control frameworks, such as4,5 to
assess cloud providers. In such frameworks, security controls can be considered as high-level security requirements
driving the cloud provider selection. Such cloud security control frameworks also deﬁne de-facto industrial standards
for securing cloud infrastructures. Many critical business applications have strong requirements over cloud computing
risks, and require a risk analysis before deciding to deploy them on a cloud computing platform.
Based on the above analysis, it is critical to specify security requirements on cloud deployments, link them with
other requirement types and exploit them to properly manage and reconﬁgure cloud-based applications. As such,
in the context of the PaaSage project www.paasage.eu, following a MDE approach towards multi-cloud application
management, a security domain speciﬁc language (DSL) has been carefully designed and integrated with other project
DSLs (collectivelly named as CAMEL – Cloud Application Modelling & Execution Language). Such integration
enables this DSL to completely specify requirements on the application deployment and application reconﬁguration
rules. OCL6 constraints are coupled with this DSL to enforce the security domain semantics to guarantee that only
syntactically and semantically correct security models are produced.
This DSL’s design has been inspired by de facto industrial cloud security control standards4 as well as prominent
security meta-models7. This design is also minimal in respect to the amount of concepts and the complexity in
specifying security requirements to cater for a small modelling eﬀort. The main DSL features are that it enables:
(a) the speciﬁcation of high-level security requirements in terms of security controls; (b) the speciﬁcation of low-
level security requirements in terms of constraints on security parameters; (c) linking the diﬀerent types of security
requirements to support requirement traceability; (d) it more extensively covers security metric speciﬁcation.
This paper also proposes a method to generate a basic security model, conforming to the suggested DSL, leading
to a reduced modelling eﬀort as such it can be used as a reference when creating security-oriented requirements
and adaptation rules. This model also meaningfully connects the deﬁned concrete security elements in a speciﬁc
hierarchy and partitions them accordingly in certain security domains. It also links cloud providers to high-level
security capabilities (security controls supported) to enhance provider space ﬁltering during deployment reasoning.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 analyses the security DSL proposed and how it integrates
with other PaaSage DSLs. Section 3 explains the basic security model generation method. Section 5 reviews the
related work. Finally, the last section concludes the paper and draws directions for further research.
2. PaaSaage Security DSL
2.1. Design Requirements on Security Modelling
Particular requirements for the security DSL were deﬁned concerning especially the coverage of the cloud security
domain and the integration with other CAMEL DSLs. These requirements were the following:
1. Cover basic domain concepts and their relations, such as security controls, metrics, and properties.
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Fig. 1. The security DSL proposed
2. Enable the speciﬁcation of two types of security requirements: (a) security control-based requirements and (b)
security SLOs. Associate each requirement type to priorities.
3. Align the above types of requirements to the requirement DSL
4. Align security SLOs with the way normal SLOs are speciﬁed (via CAMEL Scalability Rules Language (SRL)8).
5. Provide appropriate details for security metrics to enable their proper measurement.
6. Introduce OCL constraints to cover the security domain semantics.
7. Observe the cloud security domain and check complementarities with respect to evolving security standards
These requirements were used for the initial design of the security DSL which was then updated by considering
end-user and developer feedback. We should note that the last requirement was quite critical as it enabled covering
some information details not originally anticipated as well as the coupling with other standards.
2.2. DSL Analysis
A DSL is usually designed by specifying its abstract syntax in terms of a speciﬁc meta-model. As such, EMF Ecore
was used to specify this meta-model, depicted in Figure 1. Figure 2 also explicates the following integration points
of this DSL with other CAMEL DSLs: (a) the basic CAMEL constructs from which the security DSL was built; (b)
how security information complements other types of information in CAMEL to enable, e.g., the full speciﬁcation
of application requirements. The security DSL contains suﬃcient and minimal constructs to specify cloud security
requirements and capabilities complemented by other constructs in other CAMEL DSLs/meta-models. This enables
more focused modelling and low modelling eﬀort. In addition, it constitutes the ﬁrst complete approach towards spec-
ifying both high- and low-level security requirements as well as linking them. It is also assorted by OCL constraints,
to enable semantic and syntactic model validation, speciﬁed based on the semantics of the security domain. The sub-
sequent DSL analysis follows the presentation of diﬀerent meta-model facets, along with the respective OCL rules, in
diﬀerent sub-sections.
2.3. Security Requirements
The security meta-model can specify two types of security requirements: security control requirements and se-
curity SLOs. Each requirement type is a sub-class of HardRequirement in the CAMEL requirement DSL. Via this
sub-classing and exploiting other CAMEL constructs, end-users can specify complex combinations of any require-
ment type, involving logical AND and OR hierarchies in a tree-based structure. As such, they can specify diﬀerent
alternative service levels for an application with each level comprising both quality, security and cost requirements.
SecurityControlRequirements are linked to security controls. They express either generic security control require-
ments that should hold for any application or speciﬁc ones to hold for a certain associated application or its compo-
nents. Such requirements should hold for whichever cloud provider is used to host an application’s components. One
integration point applies here: associating the security control requirement to the Component class at the CAMEL
deployment DSL. This point is supported by an OCL constraint, checking that the referenced component is actually
part of the deployment model of the application considered.
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Fig. 2. Integration of security DSL with other CAMEL DSLs
Security SLOs are normal ServiceLevelObjectiveType(s) (class in requirement DSL ) which include security-based
constructs, like security metrics or properties. The mapping of security SLOs to security constructs is also checked
via an OCL constraint. SLOs are associated to conditions (see condition association in Figure 2) indicating that the
value of a metric or property is bound, via a comparison operator (such as GREATER THAN), to a certain threshold.
Such conditions reference the application and the respective component to indicate that they should hold under this
speciﬁc context. For instance, we might want to evaluate mean availability (represented by a respective metric) only
for a certain application component. Via this integration point with SRL (deﬁnition of conditions) and requirement
DSLs, security SLOs are expressed equivalently to any other SLO type.
2.4. Security Capabilities
To enable the proper security requirements matching, cloud provider security capabilities are modelled via the
SecurityCapability class. This class associates a provider’s data centre to a set of realised security controls. This
enables a more sophisticated and realistic mapping between security control requirements and capabilities assisting in
producing more optimal deployment plans closer to the actual security requirements posed.
2.5. Security Constructs
Four main constructs are covered: (a) security controls; (b) security metrics; (c) security metric instances; (d) secu-
rity properties. Security controls are high-level security constructs, linked to a particular security domain, indicating
whether certain high-level security features are in place in the provider’s oﬀered cloud services. These controls are
mapped to low-level constructs, security properties and metrics, to enable linking high- and low-level requirements.
Security properties are abstract or certiﬁable security characteristics which can be linked to a security control and
its security domain. They are sub-classes of the Property class in CAMEL SRL. The Certiﬁable class represents
properties that can be certiﬁed via security metrics measurements. On the other hand, abstract are high-level security
properties, not measurable by a metric, that are characterized by more concrete sub-properties. Security property
measurability is checked via a respective OCL constraint.
An abstract security property example is incident management quality, deﬁning the quality level in which incidents
are managed by a cloud system. This property has the timely incident handling certiﬁable sub-property indicating the
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system ability to timely handle security incidents. Such a property could be measured via the percentage of timely
incident responses metric indicating the system’s percentage of timely incident responses to security incidents.
Security metrics can be composite or simple. Any security metric is associated to certain information including
the metric unit, value type and monotonicity (0 for negative monotonic metrics and 1 for positive monotonic metrics),
inherited from the Metric class in SRL (see Figure 2). A RawSecurityMetric is directly computed from a Sensor,
while a CompositeSecurityMetric is computed by applying a formula over other security metrics or properties. An
example security metric is “mean time to revoke user access” deﬁned as a composite metric derived via applying an
aggregation function (i.e., AVERAGE) over a simple metric providing raw respective measurements. This composite
metric has a certain unit (e.g., SECONDS - see unit association in Figure 2), measures a speciﬁc property (e.g., “User
Access Revocation” - see property association in Figure 2) and has a particular value direction (e.g., 1).
By following the type-instance pattern, each metric instance instantiates one metric (see association metric in
Figure 2). It is also associated to speciﬁc information constituting the metric context, spanning how often aggregation
is performed (see Schedule class in Figure 2), the window of measurement (see Window class in Figure 2) and which
component is measured (e.g., a cloud provider’s VM instance). As such, concrete instances map to speciﬁc contexts
and instantiate types which are deﬁned across such contexts, enabling the re-use of the respective information.
Similarly to the type level, a security metric instance can be raw or composite. A raw metric instance is directly
associated to the sensor providing its measurements, while a composite metric instance is computed from other metric
instances (see componentMetrics association in Figure 2). Both security metric instance classes are sub-classes of
respective classes in SRL.
As it can be seen, security constructs are well integrated with SRL constructs. This integration enables both quality
and security requirements to be modelled and provides a competitive advantage to a system exploiting this combined
information to, e.g., better match user requirements with respective cloud provider capabilities.
3. Security Model Production Method and Case Study Application
While a meta-model provides the structure via which a certain model can be produced, the modelling eﬀort required
for expressing such models can be substantial, especially if rich meta-models are involved. As such, to assist modellers
and reduce their modelling eﬀort, some information in the form of basic models should be in place which can be re-
used towards specifying a complete model as desired by the modeller.
In the context of the security meta-model proposed, we desire not to have each modeller specify each time: (a) all
security controls needed to express security requirements or capabilities; (b) all security properties and metrics needed
to express security SLOs. As such, a particular method was followed enabling to produce a basic security model that
can assist modellers in security speciﬁcation tasks.
The method followed to produce the basic security model relied on three input types: (a) CSA’s security control
matrix4, (b) the consensus assessments initiative questionnaires (CAIQ)9 posing questions assisting in evaluating a
security control realisation degree and (c) two security models proposed in10,11. Concerning our ﬁrst input choice, the
security control matrix (CCM) is an extensive de-facto industrial standard well embraced by the research community
while linked to various previous proposals in the ﬁeld. Provided that the ﬁrst input was selected, the second input
was a rational choice as provides the means to associate security controls to cloud providers. The last input comprises
two models. The ﬁrst model was selected as it is embraced by the EC and was generated by a group involving
members from major industrial players. It was derived by considering the speciﬁc needs of the European cloud
market, especially regarding the security and data protection domains. The second is a quite extensive security model
produced by a research, highly-expert in security consortium. This model along with the ﬁrst one can be used as
reference to link security controls to security properties and metrics. Such a linking is crucial in assessing the degree
and quality of realization for a respective security control advertised to be supported by a cloud provider.
The ﬁrst two inputs enable us to produce two sub-models concerning: (a) security controls and (b) security control
provider capabilities. The last input enables us to produce a sub-model of security properties and metrics which
is linked to the security controls identiﬁed in the ﬁrst sub-model. As such, the method involves processing each
input, producing respective sub-models and then linking them accordingly. In the following, each method step is
analysed in detail while a pseudo-code for all the method steps can be found in https://drive.google.com/
file/d/0B1oLQgQCVlqrdG11UERKSTV5Y28/view?usp=sharing. Figure 3(a) also depicts the method content and
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(a) (b)
Fig. 3. (a) The basic security model production method; (b) Security model exploitation in PaaSage provisioning workﬂow
the respective input and output models for each method step. The way the resulting method outputs can be exploited
in the PaaSage provisioning ﬂow is depicted in Figure 3(b).
3.1. Security Control Sub-Model Production
By processing each CCM entry, we collected the following types of information for each security control: its ID,
domain, sub-domain and its description. Based on this information, we created a domain hierarchy (based on the do-
main and sub-domain information) under which the respective security controls (identiﬁed by the rest of the collected
information) are placed. A security-control sub-model’s snapshot can be found at https://drive.google.com/
open?id=0B1oLQgQCVlqrT0F4NFZwZmt1bm8. In this snapshot you can see that, for instance, the domain “Applica-
tion & Interface Security” has “Application Security” as its sub-domain and the latter domain contains the “AIS-01”
security control. In total, 151 domains were created, from which 13 were root, as well as 133 security controls.
3.2. Security Control Capability Sub-Model Production
When answered by cloud providers, the CAIQ questionnaire can be used to indicate how well the CCM’s security
controls have been realized, if realized at all. As such, each security control is associated to a set of questions.
Answers to the questions can have the form of “yes” or “no” or can be more involved. In fact, as diﬀerent CAIQ
versions were circulated, diﬀerent ways to represent this information were employed. In version “v1.1” (published
in 2011), questions are answered in a single column where the cloud provider is free to provide any answer type. In
version “v3.0.1” (published in 2014), the question answering involves two columns: (i) one indicating a “yes” or “no”
answer; (ii) another justifying the previous answer.
As such, each cloud provider maps to one questionnaire answering and the latter must be processed to produce the
provider’s security control capabilities. The main problems with processing such input were the following: (a) version
“v1.1” of an answered questionnaire requires manual inspection and interference to evaluate whether an involved
answer to a certain query is positive or negative, and (b) IDs of the security controls map to diﬀerent CCM versions
for each CAIQ version. The ﬁrst problem was handled in a manual way for CAIQ version “v1.1” but it is envisaged
that in the future either a more automated approach is followed or all cloud providers will resort to answering the
newer CAIQ version. The second problem was handled by associating the previous security control ID with the new
one when processing the CCM matrix as the old control ID is also represented as a CCM column.
The main algorithm of this second step is as follows:
1. Process each questionnaire answer of a cloud provider depending on the CAIQ version
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(a) If CAIQ version is “v1.1”, ﬁrst manually alter the questionnaire to include a new column indicating whether
the answer to a query is “yes” or “no”. Then, check the percentage of queries positively answered for a
security control. If this percentage is above threshold T, associate security control to the respective cloud
provider in the following way: check the mapping of old to new security control ID, ﬁnd the security
control id by searching it at the security control sub-model, create a SecurityControlCapability for the cloud
provider if not exists and ﬁnally associate to it the security control.
(b) If version is “v3.0.1”, ﬁrst check for each query the answer in respective column. For all queries of a certain
security control, compute the percentage for which the answer was positive. If the percentage is above T,
associate the security control to the respective cloud provider security control capability by ﬁrst identifying
the security control via a query on the security control sub-model and then creating the capability.
In the end, all cloud providers which have provided an answer to the questionnaire will be associated to all the security
controls for which the realization degree is above threshold T. This threshold was set with the value of 0.65 indicating
that 65 percent of related queries to a security control need to be positively answered. In the future, the assessment
of whether a security control has been realized could be modiﬁed to consider each query’s signiﬁcance to the control
realization. However, this requires great manual work and probably some discussions with security experts. Thus, it
was decided to be left as future work. The threshold could also be either modiﬁed, if deemed too low or high, or our
approach could be slightly modiﬁed to indicate also the realisation degree for each security control when associated to
a respective cloud provider. Either solution along with the respective future work direction will be examined in detail
so as to appropriately adapt our security control capability production step.
3.3. Security Property and Metric Sub-Model Production
By relying on EC’s recent recommendation in terms of the content of SLAs and especially with respect to a certain
set of security properties (now called security model Model1) to be considered in such SLAs10 as well as the research
work conducted in the Cumulus European project11 resulting in a particular security model (now called Model2),
we have developed a semi-automatic algorithm able to map the security properties and metrics recommended by EC
to the CSA’s security controls. The main rationale is to have a structured way to ﬁlter cloud providers based on
security requirements starting from high-level constructs, such as security controls, and going down to more concrete
ones, such as security properties and metrics. As such, we can also identify measurable security objectives, also
recommended by the EC, which can then be used to assess the degree and quality of the respective security controls
realization as well as react on critical security situations.
The analysis of the step’s main algorithm now follows. For each security element e in Model1, we ﬁrst check
whether it is a security property or metric and create the respective security meta-model class instance. If this element
maps to a security property p in Model2, we copy the property hierarchy above this matched property (i.e., create
also its parent properties) and then match its domain with the security control top domains. The domain matching
will result in considering some security controls (of the matched domains) to be the high-level candidates to be linked
with the matched property’s highest property ancestor a. A particular security control is then selected, if its semantics
match the ancestor property’s semantics in the sense that if a security control is realized, the property is also satisﬁed.
If e in Model1 is not matched to a Model2 property, we ﬁrst check if a higher-level property a can be created to
bridge the gap between the unmatched security element and the respective security control to be linked to it. Here this
task relies on the experience of the authors in the security domain and their knowledge of many prominent security
and quality models (as sometimes there is usually an overlap between these two model types). Once the new, high-
level property a is created, an equivalent sub-process with respect to the previous case is followed where ﬁrst the
most appropriate domain d is discovered and then the most appropriate security control is selected which matches the
semantics of the higher-level security property.
In the end, the input security models are transformed to the desired output security sub-model, part of which is
depicted in Figure 4. In total, 34 security properties were modelled out of which 14 were root while 6 were mapped
to speciﬁc metrics. The security properties were connected to 17 CCM security controls. As it can be easily seen, a
hierarchy of class instances has been created, where from the top we can see the domains going down to the security
controls down to the properties and sub-properties and ﬁnally to the metrics that measure them.
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Fig. 4. Snapshot of the security model produced
To better comprehend the algorithm analysed above, we provide two examples mapping to the two cases addressed
by this algorithm. The ﬁrst example concerns the property of “user authentication and identity assurance level” in
Model1. This property also exists in Model2 and is linked in that model to the higher level property of “identity
assurance”. Via the domain of the latter property, “Identity & Access Management”, we search for those security
controls in this top-level domain (13 in number and all preﬁxed with “IAM” in their ID) that must have the same
semantics with this property. In this way, the security control identiﬁed by IAM-02 is discovered, related to established
policies and procedures at the provider side which ensure appropriate identity, entitlement and access management.
The second example concerns the property of “mean time required to revoke user access” which is not mapped
to any property in Model2. As such, we ﬁrst created a higher-level property to be ﬁnally linked with the respective
security control, named as “User access revocation” indicating the ability of a cloud provider to revoke user access.
Then, by searching all possible top domains in the security control sub-model, the “Identity & Access Management”
domain was selected and its respective security controls were inspected. The most suitable security control from those
inspected was found to be IAM-11 related to the timely de-provisioning of user access to data and to organizationally-
owned or managed applications or infrastructural components.
4. Related Work
High-relevant work relates to certain security models and meta-models. Our proposal includes generating a security
model that better links high- to low-level security constructs, while it can be expanded to include information from
existing sophisticated models (11). It also includes a minimal but suﬃcient security DSL which is more elaborate than
other security metric meta-models.
4.1. Security Models
ENISA report in12 proposes a multi-dimensional taxonomy of resilience metrics, comprising the temporal dimen-
sions of the incident and the dimension of parts of diﬀerent disciplines or domains that constitute resilience.
Both the National Institute of Security and Standards (NIST) and the Center for Internet Security (CIS) have
proposed similar security models that include a detailed taxonomy of security metrics. CIS provides two metrics
92   Kyriakos Kritikos and Philippe Massonet /  Procedia Computer Science  97 ( 2016 )  84 – 93 
categorizations13: (a) based on the business function; (b) based on the metric purpose and audience. On the other
hand, NIST categorises metrics14 as implementation, eﬀectiveness/eﬃciency and impact measures.
Arshad et al. 15 propose a fault model for cloud computing based on which a security requirements model was
developed for compute intensive workloads. Each security requirement is associated to a speciﬁc metric which in turn
is mapped to one of three main security properties, namely integrity, availability and conﬁdentiality.
CSA aims to associate CCM’s security controls to concrete and quantiﬁable metrics. To achieve this goal, CSA’s
Metrics Work Group (CSA Metrics WG) has deﬁned 10 metrics which cover approximately 25 security controls.
The EU CUMULUS project deﬁned a quite rich and extensive vocabulary11 connecting 16 CCM control domains
with both abstract and certiﬁable security properties. This security model could be joined with our basic security
model to cover additional CCM domains and respective security controls.
4.2. Security Meta-Models
The CUMULUS security property meta-model7 associates each security property, complex or simple, to an at-
tributes set characterizing it. While it is comprehensive and extensive, covering also security requirements character-
ization (e.g., threats or attacks) and their type (e.g., application, certiﬁcation), it does not cover security metrics.
Wang16 proposes a formal properties set to hold for any security metric and a hierarchical model structure for
security models comprising 3 main layers: (a) user space where security is deﬁned as exhibited by users, (b) service
space where intermediate-level security requirements for services are posed and (c) physical infrastructure space
where the security requirements on the infrastructure supporting the intermediate-level services is speciﬁed.
Fenz and Ekelhart17 propose a security ontology including important concepts, like security controls, threats, vul-
nerabilities, assets and properties. This ontology covers more concepts than our security DSL so could be considered
for further extending it. However, the ontology does not provide details for each security concept, such as its main
attributes. It does not also model security metrics. In18, Fenz proposes a particular automated methodology via which
ISO-27001 security metrics can be generated based on the organization-speciﬁc control implementation knowledge.
The PoSecCo EU project19 developed an ontology set covering many aspects of a service-based system, like
access control, application, network, and virtualization. Then, by relying on inferencing and the knowledge of an IT
resource’s security capabilities, security capabilities for a pattern of software components can be derived. All possible
security conﬁguration alternatives can also be produced to satisfy a speciﬁc IT policy. This is a diﬀerent cloud provider
security capability evaluation approach than ours, relying on information not available in the public cloud world.
In20, a security-based MDE approach is proposed where security requirements are decoupled from the application
such that multiple security requirements posed by diﬀerent tenants can be enforced on the same application instance.
This approach exploits a security meta-model covering concepts, such as security controls but not security metrics.
Nuez et al. 21 deﬁne a meta-model for accountability properties and metrics, out of which a certain model is gener-
ated linking the transparency property to a metric as well as to CCM security controls by relying on CAIQ.
NIST and CIS deﬁne particular metric templates providing all appropriate information to realise security metrics.
The CIS template includes information like the metric’s formula, unit, measurement frequency, the data sources from
which it will be calculated and the target threshold for the measure’s satisfactory rating. The NIST metric template
involves similar information but includes the statistical function for aggregation. Compared to SRL, most information
speciﬁed by these templates is already covered with particular exceptions due to the nature of the metrics types and
diﬀerences in the evaluation procedure. The exceptions include: (a) the target which should be part of a metric
condition; (b) reporting format and responsible parties - this information is external to the metric speciﬁcation itself;
(c) implementation evidence. The metric templates proposed lack any type of formality, mapping to simple tables with
textual entries. They do not also cover aspects like: (a) metric value type; (b) metric type (simple or composite); (c)
metric composition - they just mention the metric formula and statistical function which maps to the actual deﬁnition
of two levels of metrics, simple and composites, thus liming the metric composition cases that can be covered.
5. Conclusions and Future Work
This paper proposes a DSL enabling to specify diﬀerent security requirement types, from the highest to more con-
crete levels. Such requirements, along with functional and quality ones, can then drive cloud application deployment
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and adaptive provisioning. The proposed DSL is the ﬁrst of its kind and was especially designed to be integrated with
the CAMEL family of cloud-related DSLs focusing on diﬀerent and complementary aspects to security. A set of OCL
constraints were also modelled to enable the syntactic and semantic validation of models conforming to this DSL.
This paper also proposes a method able to produce a basic security model characterized by the following features:
(a) it considers all CCM security controls; (b) it considers recommended security properties and metrics by the EC
that should be utilized in security SLAs; (c) it meaningfully connects all this information to enable users to specify
security requirements at diﬀerent levels of abstraction. Such a basic security model lowers the user modelling eﬀort
to the minimum when specifying security requirements.
The next research directions are envisaged. First, considering prominent security models to produce a full-ﬂedged
basic security model connecting all CCM security controls to high-level properties which are then elaborated until
the level of concrete metrics to enable the measurement and evaluation of concrete security levels. Second, extending
the security DSL to cover possibly neglected security aspects or improve modelling of the current aspects considered.
Third, coupling the security DSL with other standardised cloud languages like TOSCA to enable users to have a full
control over all possible aspects when deﬁning their application requirements. Apart from TOSCA, WS-Agreement
could also beneﬁt from the proposed DSL as this would enable users specifying all possible SLO types.
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